Adversarial attacks that generate small L p -norm perturbations to mislead classifiers have limited success in blackbox settings and with unseen classifiers. These attacks are also fragile with defenses that use denoising filters and to adversarial training procedures. Instead, adversarial attacks that generate unrestricted perturbations are more robust to defenses, are generally more successful in blackbox settings and are more transferable to unseen classifiers. However, unrestricted perturbations may be noticeable to humans. In this paper, we propose a content-based blackbox adversarial attack that generates unrestricted perturbations by exploiting image semantics to selectively modify colors within chosen ranges that are perceived as natural by humans. We show that the proposed approach, ColorFool, outperforms in terms of success rate, robustness to defense frameworks and transferability five state-of-the-art adversarial attacks on two different tasks, scene and object classification, when attacking three state-of-the-art deep neural networks using three standard datasets. We will make the code of the proposed approach and the whole evaluation framework publicly available.
Introduction
Adversarial attacks perturb the intensity values of a clean image to mislead machine learning classifiers, such as Deep Neural Networks (DNNs). These perturbations can be restricted [7, 16, 19, 22, 23, 26] or unrestricted [1, 13] with respect to the pixel intensity values in the clean image. Restricted perturbations, which are generated by controlling some L p norm, may restrain the maximum change for each pixel (L ∞ norm [7, 16, 19] ), the maximum number of perturbed pixels (L 0 norm [22, 26] ), or the maximum energy change (L 2 norm [23] ); whereas unrestricted perturbations span a wider range determined by different colorization approaches [1, 13] .
Defenses against adversarial attacks apply requantization [29] , median filtering [29] and JPEG compression [4, 8] to remove adversarial perturbations prior to classification, or improve the robustness of the classifier through adversarial training [10] or by changing the loss function [25] . The property of robustness of an adversarial attack is the success rate of misleading a classifier in the presence of defense frameworks. Most adversarial attacks assume white-box settings, i.e. the attacker has full knowledge of the architecture and parameters (and hence gradients) of the model [7, 16, 19, 22, 23, 26] . However, real-world restrictions may limit the exposed information of a classifier to only query access (black-box settings) or even no access (unseen classifier). The property of transferability is the success rate of adversarial images in misleading an unseen classifier [5] . Finally, the perturbation in an adversarial image should be unnoticeable, i.e. the shape and spatial arrangement of objects in the adversarial image should be perceived as in the clean image, and the colors should look natural.
Restricted perturbations [2, 16, 19, 23] often have high spatial frequencies that can be detected by defenses [4, 8, 21, 29] . Moreover, restricted perturbations that are sparse and with large changes in intensity are noticeable [22, 26] . Instead, unrestricted attacks arbitrarily can perturb intensity values through a colorization [1] based on an expensive training phase followed by per-image adversarial finetuning. Alternatively, attacks can arbitrarily change the hue and saturation components in the HSV color space [13] . However, even small variations can result in large, perceivable distortions and unnatural colors (see Fig. 1(g) ).
In this paper, we propose an unrestricted, content-based adversarial attack that exploits the characteristics of the human visual system to selectively alter colors. The proposed approach, ColorFool, operates only on the de-correlated a and b channels of the perceptually uniform Lab color space [27] , without changing the lightness, L. Moreover, ColorFool introduces perturbations only within a chosen natural-color range for specific semantic categories [30] and does not need knowledge of the parameters or gradients of the attacked classifier (black-box). Finally, this adversarial color perturbation can be generated for images of any Figure 1 . Adversarial image generated for a sample (a) clean image by (b) the proposed ColorFool, (c) BIM [16] , (d) TI-BIM [7] , (e) DeepFool [23] , (f) SparseFool [22] and (g) SemanticAdv [13] . BIM and DeepFool generate unnoticeable adversarial images with restricted perturbations. ColorFool generates any size naturalcolor adversarial images by considering the semantic information and preserving the colors of regions within an image that the human vision system is more sensitive to, in this case the person. In the bottom right, the predicted class.
size. We validate ColorFool in attacking three state-of-theart DNNs (ResNet50, ResNet18 [11] and AlexNet [15] ) that have been trained for scene and object classification tasks using three datasets (ImageNet [6] , CIFAR-10 [14] and Private Places365 (P-Places365) [31] ). We show that ColorFool generates natural-color adversarial images that are effective in terms of success rate in seen and unseen classifiers, robustness to defense frameworks on an extensive comparison with five state-of-the-art attacks.
Adversarial attacks
Let X ∈ Z w,h,c be an RGB image with width w, height h and c = 3 channels. Let M (·) be a DNN classifier that predicts for a given image the most probable class, y = M (X). An adversarial attack perturbs X and generates an adversarial image,Ẋ, such that M (Ẋ) = M (X).
Adversarial attacks can be grouped into two categories, namely restricted and unrestricted perturbations. An adversarial image can be generated with a controlled perturbation by L 0 , L 1 , L 2 or L ∞ norms. Adversarial attacks that use restricted perturbations are BIM [16] , TI-BIM [7] , DeepFool [23] and SparseFool [22] . Alternatively, an adversarial image can be generated with an unrestricted perturbation on the colors considering the preservation of the shape of the objects, as in SemanticAdv [13] or BigAdv [1] .
BIM [16] constrains the maximum perturbation of each pixel by imposing an L ∞ -norm constraint. BIM searches adversarial images by linearising the cost function, J M (·), in the input space. The search starts fromẊ 0 = X and iteratively moves in the direction of the gradient of the cost of predicting y with respect to the clean image, ∇ X J M (·), with step size δ ≤ in each iteration:
or a maximum number of iterations, where θ are the parameters of M , sign(·) is the sign function that determines the direction of the gradient of the cost function and C X, (·) is the clipping function that maintains the adversarial images within the -neighborhood of the clean image as well as image range Z:
TI-BIM [7] generates BIM adversarial perturbations over an ensemble of translated images to improve the transferability to unseen classifiers. As the gradients of a translated image correspond to translating the gradient of the original image [7] , TI-BIM convolves the gradient with a pre-defined kernel W at each iteration:
where W can be a uniform, linear or Gaussian kernel.
DeepFool [23] finds the minimal L 2 -norm adversarial perturbation by finding the direction towards the closest decision boundary. For example in the case of the binary classifier, adversarial images can iteratively be generated by projecting the adversarial image of each iteration onto the closest linearized decision boundary of M (·):
where η 1 is a constant that is multiplied by the accumulative adversarial perturbations to reach the other side of the decision boundary. Note that DeepFool does not impose constraints on pixel values, which may therefore lie outside the permissible dynamic range of the image.
SparseFool [22] uses an L 1 -norm between the clean and adversarial images to minimize the number of perturbed pixels to exceed the closest decision boundary of the predicted class based on the geometry properties of M (·). SparseFool leverages the fact that DNNs have a low mean curvature in the neighborhood of each image [9] and generates sparse perturbations based on this curvature and adversarial images on the closest L 2 decision boundary. SparseFool approximates the decision boundary near to the clean 
where P (·) ensures that the value of each pixel of adversarial images are between l, u ∈ R, and δ * is the sparse adversarial noise that each of its coordinate is iteratively computed based on the projection of each adversarial image,Ẋ n , towards its maximum unused coordinate of the normal vector, d:
where T is the transpose operator. SemanticAdv [13] unrestrictedly changes colors in the HSV color space by shifting the hue, H, and saturation, S, values of the clean image while preserving the value channel, V , in order to not affect the shapes of objects:
where β(·) is a function that converts the intensities of an image from RGB to HSV color space, X H and X S are the original hue and saturation channels and
or a maximum number of trials (1000) is reached. BigAdv [1] aims to generate natural-color perturbation by fine-tuning, for each X, a trained colorization model [30] , F (·), parametrised by θ with a cross-entropy adversarial loss J adv :
where X L is the L channel of the image in the Lab color space and C h is the ground-truth color (color hints) for the locations that are indicated by the binary location hint, L h . BigAdv de-colorizes the whole image and again colorizes it, which makes it inefficient and it may severely distort the colors if C h and L h are not carefully set. Finally, ColorFool, our proposed approach (see Sec. 3), is an unrestricted, black-box method like SemanticAdv. However, SemanticAdv perturbs pixel intensities without considering the content in an image thus often producing unnatural colors. ColorFool instead perturbs colors only in specific semantic regions and within a chosen range so they can be still perceived as natural. The other state-of-theart unrestricted method, BigAdv is a white-box attack that needs to train a colorization model to learn image statistics from large datasets and to fine-tune it per each clean image that can mislead the classifier. Table 1 summarizes the adversarial attacks for object or scene classification tasks.
ColorFool
We aim to design a black-box adversarial attack that generates adversarial images with natural colors through generating low-frequency perturbations that are highly transferable to unseen classifiers and robust to defenses. Moreover, the attack shall operate on the native size of the images.
First, we identify image regions whose color is important for a human observer as the appearance of these sensitive regions is typically within a specific range (e.g. skin color). Other (non-sensitive) image regions, instead, may have their colors modified within an arbitrary range and still look natural [3] . We consider four categories of sensitive regions, whose unusual colors would attract the attention of a human observer [3, 18, 30] : person, sky, vegetation (grass and trees), and water (sea, river, waterfall, swimming pool, and lake).
Let us decompose an image X into K semantic regions
where M k ∈ R w,h is the k-th binary mask of D(X), with D Figure 2 . Sample results of image semantic segmentation [32] . ColorFool identifies color sensitive semantic regions person (in orange), vegetation (in green), sky (in light blue) and water (in dark blue), and non-sensitive regions (in black).
a semantic classification algorithm. Specifically, we use as D a pyramid Pooling R50-Dilated architecture of Cascade Segmentation Module segmentation [33] , trained on MIT ADE20K dataset [32] on 150 semantic region types. Fig. 2 shows examples of the considered semantic regions. We separate the sensitive regions,
, from non-sensitive regions, S = {S k } S k=1 regions. After identifying these two sets of regions, we attack the image by appropriately modifying the colors of the region in the perceptually uniform Lab color space [27] , which separates color information from brightness: a ranges from green (-128) to red (+127), b ranges from blue (-128) to yellow (+127), and L ranges from black (0) to white (100).
We modify the color of sensitive regions, S k , to generate the setṠ aṡ
where γ(·) converts the intensities of an image from the RGB to the Lab color space, N k are the adversarial perturbations in the channels a and b that are chosen randomly from the set of natural-color ranges [30] , N a k and N b k , in a and b channels. These ranges are defined based on the actual colors, region semantics and prior knowledge about the human perception of colors in that region (see Table 2 ). We allow multiple trials, until a perturbation misleads the classifier. Let n be the index of the trial and N be the maximum number of trials. To avoid large color changes in the first trials, we progressively increase the intensity through α = n N that scales the randomly chosen perturbation.
We modify the color of non-sensitive regions, S k , to produce the setṠ aṡ
where N a ∈ {−127, . . . , 128} and N b ∈ {−127, . . . , 128}
are adversarial perturbations chosen randomly inside the Table 2 . Adversarial color perturbation considered by ColorFool to modify the colors of the sensitive semantic regions. The naturalcolor ranges are chosen based on the color recommendation of people to grey-scale objects [3, 18] that is also used as a groundtruth colors in the colorization methods [30] . The adversarial color perturbation of the k-th semantic region considers the extreme values of the semantic class as l a k = min(S k ) and u a k = max(S k ). The adversarial perturbation is chosen randomly within each natural-color range and apply as in Eq. 10. Note that we do not change the color of persons within the image, as it attracts the attention of a viewer more than others.
Semantic region a channel b channel whole range of a and b, as the regions can undergo larger intensity changes. Finally, the adversarial imageẊ generated by ColorFool combines the modified sensitive and non-sensitive image regions asẊ
where Q(·) is the quantization function that ensures that the generated adversarial image isẊ ∈ Z w,h,c and γ −1 (·) is a function that converts the intensities of an image from the Lab to the RGB color space.
ColorFool repeats the process from Eq. 10 until M (Ẋ) = M (X) or the maximum number of trials, N = 1000, is reached. For several examples of adversarial images generated by ColorFool see the supplementary material.
Validation
Algorithms under comparison. We compare against all of the state-of-the-art adversarial attacks discussed in Section 2: Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [16] , TranslationInvariant BIM (TI-BIM) [7] , DeepFool [23] , SparseFool [22] and SemanticAdv [13] . We discard comparing against BigAdv [1] as the code is not available and we found the manuscript not objectively reproducible. We choose these algorithms as they include restricted and unrestricted attacks and they are known for generating adversarial images that are transferable (TI-BIM), unnoticeable (DF) and robust to defenses (SemanticAdv). We also compare against the simple yet successful BIM attack and SparseFool, a sparse attack. Furthermore, we consider a modification of the proposed method, named ColorFool-r, where no priors are considered for the semantic regions. We use the authors' implementations for all adversarial attack methods apart from SemanticAdv that we re-implemented in PyTorch. All adversarial examples are generated using the same read/write framework, image filters and software version in PyTorch and OpenCV to make the results comparable.
Datasets. We evaluate on three datasets Private-Places365 (P-Places365) [31] , a scene classification dataset; CIFAR-10 [14] , an object classification dataset; and ImageNet [6] , another object classification dataset. For P-Places365, we employ a subset of classes that are defined as P-sensitive in Mediaeval 2018 Pixel Privacy Challenge [17] . The private subset of Places365 dataset includes 50 images per each of the 60 private scene classes. For CIFAR-10, we use the whole test set composed of 10K images of 10 different object classes. For ImageNet, we consider the 1000 classes and 3 random images per class from the validation set. All the images are RGB with varying resolution except for the images from CIFAR-10 whose dimensions are 32 × 32 pixels.
Classifiers under attack. We conduct the attacks on two different architectures: deep residual neural network (ResNet [11] , 18 layers (R18) and 50 layers (R50)) and AlexNet (AN) [15] . We chose these classifiers to study the transferability comparing both homogeneous (i.e. ResNet classifiers) and heterogeneous architectures (AlexNet).
Performance measures. We quantify the success rate in misleading a classifier, the robustness to defenses and the image quality of the adversarial images. The success rate (SR) is quantified as the ratio between the number of adversarial images that mislead the classifier on its most-likely predicted class and the total number of images. For the transferability, we compute the SR of adversarial images when misleading an unseen classifier. The robustness to defenses is measured in three forms. Firstly, we quantify the SR in seen classifiers of adversarial images after filtering. As filters we use re-quantization [29] using 1 to 7 bits in steps of 1; median filtering [29] with squared kernel of dimension 2, 3 and 5 and lossy JPEG compression [8, 4] with JPEG quality parameter of 25, 50, 75 and 100. We report the results on retrieving the class that was predicted on the clean images with the most effective filter (i.e. the one that obtains the lowest SR). Secondly, we report the undetectability as the ratio between adversarial images not identified as adversarials and the total number of images using feature squeezing framework [29] when using the previously mentioned image filters. Specifically, for each classifier and parameter of each image filter, we compute a threshold that determines if an image is adversarial or benign by comparing the L 1 norm of the difference between the probability vector of the given image and the same image after the image filtering. Each threshold is calculated as the value that allows for a 5% false-positive rate in detecting benign images on Table 3 . Success rate on Private-Places365 (P-Places365), CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets; against ResNet50 (R50), ResNet18 (R18) and AlexNet (AN). The performance of these classifiers on the clean images is presented in the first row. The higher the success rate the most successful the attack. Key: AC, attacked classifier; TC, test classifier; Acc, accuracy. Grey/white-shadowed indicates seen/unseen classifier. ColorFool is more transferable than other adversarial attacks, except SemanticAdv that severely distort the colors of all regions (see Fig. 5 ). a training dataset. Then, images with L 1 norm difference larger than the threshold are considered to be adversarials. Thirdly, we evaluate the SR when attacking a seen classifier trained with Prototype Conformity Loss (PCL) [25] and adversarial training [10] . We quantify the image quality of the adversarial with a non-reference perceptual image quality measure named neural image assessment (NIMA) [28] trained on AVA dataset [24] . NIMA estimates the perceived image quality and it has been shown effective to automatically estimate the preferences of images by humans [17] .
Attack
Success rate. Table 3 shows the SR on a seen classifier (ondiagonal elements) and transferability to unseen classifiers (off-diagonal elements). All adversarial attacks achieve high SR in a seen classifier for most of the classifiers and datasets. However, restricted attacks never achieve a SR higher than 0.41 in unseen classifiers; while unrestricted attacks achieve a SR of up to 0.77. ColorFool achieves a high SR on both seen and unseen classifiers with, for example, 0.97 when both attacking and testing in R18 in CIFAR-10 and 0.69 and 0.41 when evaluated with AN and R50, respectively. However, other attacks only achieve SRs of 0.02 (BIM), 0.14 (TI-BIM), 0.07 (DeepFool), 0.21 (SparseFool). A possible reason is that restricted attacks such as BIM iteratively overfit to the parameters of the specific classifier, which means that the adversarial images rarely mislead other classifiers, while the randomness in changing the color in ColorFool prevents this overfitting. TI-BIM aims at addressing the overfitting of BIM and achieves higher transferability than BIM, while its SR in seen classifiers decreases. Unconstrained attacks obtain high transferability rates. For instance, SemanticAdv, CF-r and CF obtain SRs of 0.71, 0.69 and 0.70 when attacking ResNet18 and evaluating in AlexNet. While ColorFool outperforms SemanticAdv with seen classifiers, SemanticAdv obtains higher transferability rates. This is due to the large color changes that SemanticAdv introduces in all parts of the image, including the ones that are more informative to the classifier (higher transferability) but also to regions of the image that sensitive to the human vision system, thus, generating highly unnatural-looking images (see Fig. 5 ). Further insights are discussed in the image quality analysis later in this section. As previously studied [20] , adversarial images generated on stronger classifiers (e.g. R50) show a higher transferability rate when tested on weaker classifiers (e.g. AN). This behavior can be observed, for instance, when looking at the results of ColorFool in P-Places365. Adversarial images crafted with R50 obtain a SR of 0.96 which decreases to 0.49 when tested in AN. However, when adversarial images are crafted with AN the SR is 0.99, but when tested in R50 (a stronger classifier) the SR is of only 0.17.
Robustness to defenses. The SR after applying the three image filters is depicted in Fig. 3 . Restricted attacks such as DeepFool and SparseFool are the least robust to image filtering, as these filters can remove restricted adversarial noises (especially L 0 sparse adversarial perturbation) prior to the classification and correctly classify around 70% of them. BIM and TI-BIM obtain higher SR than other restricted attacks in P-Places365 and ImageNet but similar in CIFAR-10. The most robust attacks are the unrestricted ones where SemanticAdv, ColorFool-r and ColorFool consistently obtain a SR above 60% across datasets and models. A robust adversarial attack should be undetectable not only by a specific image filter but by any. The undetectability results (Fig. 4) show that restricted attacks are more detectable than unrestricted ones when considering all image filters across all classifiers and datasets. For instance, when attacking R50 in P-Places365, BIM, TI-BIM, DF and SF obtain undetectability rates of 5%, 19%, 1% and 11% when considering all types of image filtering. Meanwhile, unrestricted attacks such as SemanticAdv, ColorFool-r and ColorFool obtain 73%, 72% and 75%. We believe that one reason for this is related to the frequency component of the Table 4 . Success rate of BIM, TI-BIM, DeepFool (DF), SparseFool (SF), SemanticAdv (SA), ColorFool-r (CF-r) and ColorFool (CF) against ResNet110 trained with softmax, on Prototype Conformity Loss (PCL) [25] and its conjunction with adversarial training (AdvT) [10] on CIFAR-10. The higher the success rate, the more robust the attack. In bold, the best performing attack. generated adversarial perturbations. Restricted attacks generate high-frequency adversarial perturbations, whereas unrestricted attacks generate low-frequency perturbations (see Fig.5 ). Low-frequency perturbations (those generated by unrestricted attacks) are more robust to re-quantization, median filtering and JPEG compression. In general, JPEG compression is the most effective detection framework.
When we consider all of the filters applied, as an example, to P-Places365, the restricted attacks BIM, TI-BIM, DeepFool and SparseFool are detectable in 95%, 81%, 99% and 89% of the times. However, unrestricted attacks such as SemanticAdv and ColorFool-r are detectable only 27% of the times and the proposed ColorFool is the least detectable with only 25%. Another observation is that the robustness of the adversarial images is proportional to the accuracy of the classifier used for their generation (see Figs. 3, 4) . For example, misleading a high-accuracy DNN such as R50 with almost 0.95 accuracy on CIFAR-10 dataset needs bigger adversarial perturbations that make adversarial images more robust but detectable. Table 4 shows the SR of adversarial attacks in misleading ResNet110 [11] trained on CIFAR-10 as well as the robustness to an improved training procedure based on PCL [25] and its conjunction with adversarial training [10] . For the adversarial training, ResNet110 is trained using clean and adversarial images generated by BIM that is the strongest defense [12] . Interestingly, Table 4 shows that ColorFool is robust as its SR remains above 99% when misleading ResNet110 equipped with both PCL and adversarial training defenses. However, the SR of restricted adversarial attacks drops by 50%. . Undetectability (y-axis) of BIM, TI-BIM, DeepFool, SparseFool, SemanticAdv, ColorFool-r and ColorFool, when attacking R50, R18 and AN classifiers (first, second and third square of each color, respectively) using re-quantization, median filtering and JPEG compression. The higher the undetectability, the more robust the attack is to defenses.
restricted attacks obtain the highest NIMA scores across all attacks, classifiers and datasets. Specifically, in PPlaces365 and ImageNet, ColorFool-r and ColorFool obtain the highest scores (over 5.19). For CIFAR-10, SemanticAdv, ColorFool-r and ColorFool obtain similar results with scores over 4.96. This implies that adversarial images gen- Random image id Figure 6 . Influence of the randomness in the generation of adversarial images with ColorFool with 500 random initializations on the success rate, the number of trials to converge and the number of different final classes at convergence with thirteen random images (x-axis) from ImageNet when attacking ResNet50.
ness regarding the success rate, the number of trials to converge and whether the final class varies. We execute ColorFool 500 times with thirteen random images from ImageNet belong to different classes for attacking ResNet50. We select ResNet50 for this analysis as it is the most accurate classifier among the consider ones. Fig. 6 shows the SR, the statistics (median, min, max, 25 percentile and 75 percentile) of the number of trials to converge and the number of classes that the executions converge to. Results for different images are shown on the x-axis. We can observe that the number of trials that ColorFool requires to converge remains with a low median and standard deviation for images that always succeed in misleading the classifier (see the first and second plot in Fig. 6 ). Finally, most of the executions for a given image converge to the same class (see median value in the third plot in t Fig. 6 ) regardless of the randomness.
Conclusion
We proposed a novel black-box adversarial attack, ColorFool, that changes the color of semantic regions within an image, based on priors of the human perception to colors. ColorFool achieves state-of-the-art results regarding success rate in misleading seen and unseen classifiers, robustness to defenses that employ image filtering, adversarial training or improve the loss function as well as being less detectable than restricted attacks, especially to JPEG compression. Furthermore, ColorFool generates adversarial images with the same size as the clean images. We hope that our work encourages future studies on adversarial attacks that simultaneously consider the human visual system and the semantic information of the objects in the image, and new defenses against colorization to make DNNs robust to color changes.
As future work, we will study the use of colorization adversarial attacks for improving the robustness of DNNs trough adversarial training, evaluate existing adversarial attacks under other defenses, study advanced perceptual image quality algorithms as well as explore the behavior of colorization adversarial attacks in tasks such as object detection and image semantic segmentation.
